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Tahoe’s Requiem: The Death of the Scalian View
of Property and Justice

Laura S. Underkuffler*

I. INTRODUCTION
In the two latest “takings” cases decided by the United States
Supreme Court,1 the string of recent victories by landowners against
government seems to have come to an abrupt halt. Although Palazzolo v.
Rhode Island2 and Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency3 were not unmitigated defeats for landowners,
the Court’s broad assumption in these cases that an ad hoc, balancing test
should be used to resolve conflicting private and public claims in regulatory
takings cases was certainly not what these landowners sought.
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Of course, the idea that an ad hoc, balancing test might be used in
takings cases is not new. For many years this approach has remained a
residual doctrinal category into which cases not covered by the Court’s
other, per se rules4 would fall. For instance, in Penn Central Transportation
Company v. New York City,5 the Court famously stated that a takings
analysis involves “essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries” which weigh “[t]he
economic impact of the regulation on the claimant” and the “character of
the governmental action.”6 However, commentators have rightly sensed
that the change wrought by Palazzolo and Tahoe is more than the simple
return to prominence of a traditional idea. In Tahoe, in particular, the direct
and emphatic nature of the Court’s underscoring of this test signals more.
Tahoe signals, in some fundamental way, a shift in the way that property
rights and their protection are viewed.
In this article, I shall explore what this shift is and why it has so
deservedly caught our attention. I will argue that beginning in the early
1990s, and continuing for a decade thereafter, what I shall call the “Scalian
view” of property and its protection dominated Supreme Court takings
jurisprudence. Under this doctrine, of which Justice Scalia was the
principal architect,7 the idea of property is a concrete, objectively knowable,
and immutable legal barrier which marks the boundary between protected
individual interests and the permissible exercise of government power. If
government transgresses this line, the individual is (almost always) deemed
to have been wronged. And compensation is required, as a matter of
“justice,” under the takings clause.
With the advent of Palazzolo and Tahoe, this doctrine collapsed. I
shall argue that after these cases, no longer will the idea of property be
deemed to mark, with certainty, the point where protected individual
interests end and collective power begins. No longer will the fact of
individual loss – even significant individual loss – necessarily compel the
conclusion that a wrong has occurred. And no longer will justice, in
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takings disputes, be seen in only “compensatory” terms.
The sudden collapse of the Scalian view might be seen as an abrupt
or startling turn. In fact, I shall argue that its collapse was a very
predictable product of the Court’s prior takings jurisprudence. Neither the
Scalian view’s idea of property nor its conception of justice could be
sustained as the range of potential takings expanded and acknowledgment
of the complexity of property conflicts grew. The very ideas that form the
core of the Scalian view served to doom it, from the outset, as a viable
juridical principle.
The collapse of the Scalian view was thus an entirely inevitable
outcome. It is also, I shall argue, an entirely welcome outcome, in our
effort to reassert sensible notions of takings and justice.
II. VISIONS OF PROPERTY AND VISIONS OF JUSTICE: THE RISE OF
THE ‘SCALIAN VIEW’ – AND ITS FALL
In order to understand the changes that Palazzolo and Tahoe
represent, we must first sketch the competing visions of property and justice
that shadow takings cases, and how one – what I shall call the “Scalian
view” – came to dominate the Supreme Court’s approach to takings in the
past decade.
Two philosophically divergent understandings of property and its
protection can be identified in our popular and legal culture. Under the
first, or “conservative” vision, the protection of private property is
championed, while under the second, or “progressive” vision, it is not.
Property, as protected by law, is – under the conservative vision – an
individual’s right to unfettered possession, disposition, and use of land,
chattels, or other corporeal or incorporeal things. It is the conservative
project to protect property rights through legal and political strategies from
collective predation or change. Under the progressive vision, on the other
hand, there is nothing wrong with altering rights in property should
collective goals demand it. For the progressive, the legal recognition of the
protective force of property is contingent upon the absence of
countervailing social interests.
These characterizations are of course overdrawn to some degree.
Those who adhere to the conservative vision do not deny, for instance, that
3

previously recognized property rights must yield when confronted by
particularly compelling public interests such as human health or safety.
And most progressives would admit, if pushed, that the idea of property as
contingent and yielding is not, in fact, how they view property in many
situations. For instance, their enthusiasm for the idea that welfare benefits
and public employment may be property8 and their condemnation of the
Poletown case9 were not driven by a philosophical predilection toward the
subordination of the individual to collective interests, or a vision of
property that reflects that view. In the main, however, those who adhere to
the progressive view have been far more open to the social contingency of
property rights than have their conservative counterparts. Seen in broad
brush strokes, the conservative viewpoint envisions property as individually
protective, separative, and autonomy enhancing, while the progressive sees
it as contingent, yielding, and dependent on social forces.
The takings clause of the Fifth Amendment has functioned in many
ways as the contemporary constitutional battleground for these competing
visions of property. In most of the past three decades of Supreme Court
jurisprudence, neither vision was clearly dominant. Conservative majorities
often succeeded in asserting their view of property’s protective ideal, and
protected property owners’ rights against development restrictions of land,
physical invasions of land, restrictions on the occupation or devise of land,
and other actions by government.10 Progressive Justices and their allies, on
the other hand, upheld historic preservation laws, endangered species laws,
zoning laws, anti-subsidence laws, and other social measures, even though
those laws impaired what would be widely regarded as traditional property
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rights.11
The clear ascendency of a particularly strong form of the
conservative vision in takings cases was marked by the Court’s decision in
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council12 in 1992. This case dealt with a
garden-variety, and therefore extremely important, question: whether
ecologically based shoreline regulations which prohibit further
development constitute a “taking” of the landowner’s “property.” In an
opinion that upheld the landowner’s claims, Justice Scalia took the
opportunity to entrench – as a philosophical matter, at least – a sweepingly
conservative vision of takings and property. This “Scalian view,” as
assumed in Lucas and later cases, involves the following axioms:
• Property is something that is concrete, that we can
define and understand with precision.
• Property protects the individual’s interests from collective
powers; that is its essential function.
• The takings clause reflects these truths: it is simply an
extension of this function.
As a result of these axioms, in a takings case we must ask the
following questions:
• With what property did “owner x” begin?
• What property does “owner x” have now?
• Should “owner x” be compensated for this loss?
– with this answer being “yes” unless the loss is too trivial;
there are other benefits that “owner x” has reaped; or
government has acted to protect (physical) human health or
safety.
This Scalian view has a great strength: it vindicates the idea of
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“property as protection” in which all of us, on some level, believe. In this
view, property means the protection of our possessions; it means the
protection of our “expectations”; it means the protection of what our efforts,
labor, good luck, cunning, and other circumstances have given us. The
Scalian view’s attempt to clearly, cleanly, and boldly vindicate this view
has powerful intuitive appeal.
However, behind this structure many problems lurk. Any legally
cognizable conception of property involves a theory of rights, applied to a
particular conceptual space, protected with a particular stringency, and
established at a particular time.13 Beyond these general statements,
however, the particular contours of “property” are far from obvious. For
instance, what do the “right to use,” “rights under state law,” or “traditional
rights” really mean? Is an individual’s “property” the regulated land, the
legally described parcel, the landowner’s holdings, or some other idea?
Should all “rights” that are “property” be protected with equal vigor, or
should some be protected more strongly than others? Are the “rights” that
comprise “property” those that existed at the moment of purchase, the
moment of transfer, or some other moment in history? What of regulations
that were authorized, but not yet issued? What of conditions that existed
but were, at the moment chosen, not yet recognized?
In the face of those questions, the Scalian view of property and
takings remained undaunted. In Lucas,14 Dolan,15 Phillips,16 Eastern
Enterprises,17 City of Monterey,18 and other cases, assumptions were simply
made about the nature of protected individual interests. And once these
assumptions were made, all that remained (as a practical matter) was the
application of a compensatory remedy.
In 2001, however, a serious crack in this structure appeared. In
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,19 a landowner was precluded from developing
his parcel in the manner that he wished by a state wetlands-preservation
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law. The most prominent issue was whether a landowner could challenge,
as a taking, land use regulations that were already in place when he
acquired the property. Most judges and commentators had rejected such
claims on the ground that owners who took title with knowledge of
limitations in place could not claim injury from lost value. Palazzolo
rejected this analysis. Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy asserted
that the allowance of such claims was required by “the nature of
property.”20 Property rights (in this view) are an abstract ideal, which the
takings clause protects from impairment. It makes no difference whether
this claim is asserted by the one who owns the property when the regulation
is imposed or by a later owner. Government cannot escape from a takings
claim by reason of the sale or other transfer of the property. If a wrong has
been done, the takings remedy is available not only to the person who holds
title at that moment, but also to “[f]uture generations.”21
Up to this point, the case seems to be yet another triumph for the
Scalian view of takings and property. We have a robust, compensatory
takings guarantee for state interference with a concretely conceived and
rigidly defined conception of property. Other elements in Justice Kennedy’s
opinion, however, left the situation oddly open-ended. “The right to
improve property, of course, is subject to the reasonable exercise of state
regulatory authority, including the enforcement of valid zoning and landuse restrictions.” The ultimate inquiry, he wrote, is whether a particular
state action “is so unreasonable or onerous as to compel compensation.”22
To determine this question the state court should, on remand, “address ...
the merits of petitioner’s claim under Penn Central.”23
The idea that the “onerousness” of government action might be
dispositive in takings cases is in keeping with the Scalian view, since it
makes what the claimant has lost the focus of the takings analysis. With the
addition of the “reasonableness” of government action, however, comes
a possibly very different inquiry. For instance, wetlands preservation laws
that are “onerous” may nonetheless be “reasonable,” if conditions otherwise
demand them. This seemingly broad formulation implies that other
considerations or interests, especially public interests, can trump a property
20
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owner’s otherwise legitimate complaint about a particularly onerous
regulation.
Indeed, the Court’s endorsement of the Penn Central test reinforces
this suggestion. Penn Central is a famous, pre-Scalian-view case that
advocated an ad hoc, balancing-of-interests approach to takings questions.24
Under this approach, it is not the property owner’s interests alone that count
in the takings calculation.
Whether Palazzolo’s majority opinion changed the assumptions
behind takings law was the subject of dueling concurrences by Justices
O’Connor and Scalia. In Justice O’Connor’s view, “investment-backed
expectations” – the idea which the Court had used in recent years to capture
the sphere of protected individual interests – are “not talismanic under Penn
Central.” Rather, “[e]valuation of the degree of interference with
investment-backed expectations ... is [only] one factor” in a more complex
calculation. In her view, “[t]he purposes served [by the government
action], as well as the effects produced, ... inform the takings analysis.”25
Justice Scalia resisted such murkiness and insisted that the focus remain on
the owner’s loss of value. Indeed, in his view, to allow government
interests to swamp the property owner’s loss “would [be to] ... giv[e] the
malefactor the benefit of its malefaction.”26
If Palazzolo suggested a retreat from the Scalian view, the Court’s
opinion in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency27 openly declared its abandonment. In Tahoe, the narrow
question before the Court was “whether a moratorium on development
imposed during the process of devising a comprehensive land-use plan
constitutes a per se taking of property requiring compensation.”28 On its
face, the case seemed to present an ideal opportunity for yet another
application of the Scalian view of takings and property. All development
of the petitioners’ lakeshore lots was prohibited during various moratoria,
depriving petitioners, during those periods, of all reasonable economic
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value.29 In addition, the Court had previously held that temporary takings
of all beneficial use of land were compensable.30 If the focus remained on
the landowners’ losses, the complete loss of use for a period of years
seemed to present a strong case for compensation.
Indeed, in their Supreme Court appeal, the landowners urged an
analysis of the case that tracked the Scalian view of property and takings
exactly. They contended that “the mere enactment of a temporary
regulation that ... denies a property owner all viable economic use of her
property gives rise to an unqualified constitutional obligation to compensate
her for the value of its use during that period.”31 Because the landowners
had unquestionably borne a loss, in this sense, they argued that there was
“no need to evaluate the landowners’ investment-backed expectations”
more deeply, or to consider “the importance of the public interest served by
the regulation.”32
Surprising many observers, the Tahoe majority expressly rejected
this invitation and concluded, instead, that the case was “best analyzed
within the Penn Central framework.”33 In his majority opinion, Justice
Stevens drew a sharp distinction between “physical takings” – such as those
resulting from a condemnation proceeding or a physical appropriation –
and “regulatory takings,” which “prohibit a property owner from making
certain uses of her ... property.”34 The Court’s jurisprudence “involving
condemnations and physical takings is as old as the Republic” and involves,
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The challenged prohibition on development lasted for at least 32 months, or as long
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for the most part, “per se rules” of “straightforward application.”35
Regulatory takings jurisprudence, by contrast, “is of more recent vintage
and is characterized by ‘essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries,’ ... designed
to allow ‘careful examination and weighing of all the relevant
circumstances.’”36 Although the landowner may clearly lose value as the
result of regulation, that fact is not dispositive of the takings question.
Rather, that loss must be evaluated in the context of the public program in
which it occurs, and of that program’s adjustment of economic burdens and
benefits.37
Quoting liberally from Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in
Palazzolo, Justice Stevens identified the principles set forth in Penn Central
as the “polestar” in determining regulatory takings claims.38 “‘The Takings
Clause requires careful examination and weighing of all the relevant
circumstances ... .’”39 In this calculation, “‘interference with ... investmentbacked expectations’” – that is, the landowner’s loss – is only “‘one of a
number of factors that a court must examine.’”40 Only if the regulation
effects “the permanent ‘obliteration of the value’ of a fee simple estate” is
the landowner’s loss dispositive of the takings question.41 Since the
moratoria in Tahoe did not reach this extreme, they needed to be evaluated
under the multi-factor, ad hoc, Penn Central test. In this and almost all
cases, “the concepts of ‘fairness and justice’ that underlie the Takings
Clause will be better served ... by a Penn Central inquiry into all of the
relevant circumstances.”42
In dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices Scalia and
Thomas, forcefully advocated the Scalian view of takings and property.
There is, the Chief Justice wrote, a “‘practical equivalence’ from the
landowner’s point of view” of the regulations at issue in Tahoe and a
physical appropriation.43 Under these circumstances, it is not plausible to
35

Id.
Id. at 322 (quoting Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124; Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 636
(O’Connor, J., concurring)).
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40
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Id. at 330.
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Id. at 334.
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assume that the regulations “simply ‘adjust[] the benefits and burdens of
economic life’” or that the affected landowners receive any tangible
benefits from their operation.44 With clear evidence of the landowners’
loss, and no clear evidence of their offsetting benefit, the case for
compensation was obvious. He argued that it is this approach – and not that
of Penn Central – that is required by the Court’s most recent cases.
Although Chief Justice Rehnquist was undoubtedly correct that his
approach is more in keeping with the spirit of Lucas and other Scalian-view
decisions, the majority turned a deaf ear. Indeed, after Tahoe it is apparent
that Justice O’Connor has won the Palazzolo-concurrence battle. If there
had been any prior doubt about the seriousness of the Court’s embrace of
Penn Central’s ad hoc, balancing, broad-gauged approach in takings cases,
there is no doubt now. No longer will the showing of a landowner’s loss
– even a significant loss – be sufficient, of itself, to compel compensation.
After a decade of ascendency, the Scalian view of property and takings
appears to be dead.
Why did this happen? Was this simply the result of a shift in the
philosophical winds, which might, in a few years, blow differently? Or are
there deeper reasons – rooted in part, and ironically, in Justice Scalia’s own
actions – that made this outcome inevitable?
III. THE DEATH OF THE SCALIAN VIEW – THREE REASONS
In this section, I shall argue that the Scalian view of property and
takings was doomed for three reasons. Those are: the Court’s opinion in
the Lucas case; the extension of takings protection to less tangible legal
interests; and the problem of accounting for justice in takings cases.
A. The Lucas Opinion
Treating the Court’s opinion in Lucas as something that undermined
the Scalian view of property and takings is obviously paradoxical. All
would probably agree that if there has ever been any Justice on the Court
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who has believed in property as a concrete instrument for protecting
individual interests, it is Justice Scalia, who authored that opinion. It was
undoubtedly the intention of the Lucas opinion – which established yet
another, per se, compensatory takings rule – to shore up this conception
of property. Indeed, the Lucas case marks the clear ascendency in Supreme
Court jurisprudence of the Scalian view of takings and property.
In Lucas, however, Justice Scalia’s doctrinal ambition in this regard
ran afoul of another impulse: the desire to bring intellectual rigor to the
Court’s takings jurisprudence. Given the opportunity to address the Court’s
takings jurisprudence in potentially historic terms, Justice Scalia apparently
could not resist exposing the intellectual incoherence that riddled the
Court’s prior opinions.
Let us pause, for a moment, to consider these juxtaposed goals. The
Scalian view of property and takings – in which individuals are strongly
protected from government action, by compensation for their economic
injuries – depends upon individual property being something that we can
concretely understand. If we are to afford strong, consistent remedies for
government takings of individual property, we must know what that
property is and how it has been impaired by government action. We must
know the “property” with which “owner x” began; we must know the
“property” with which “owner x” is left – with the difference between those
values being the measure of just compensation.
Of course, as noted above, the certainty of such “findings” in the
Court’s decisions has been far more rhetorical than real. Indeed, the
question of the “property” involved has generally received superficial gloss,
with the Court moving quickly to the issue of “taking.”45 Consider, for
instance, Dolan v. City of Tigard,46 a recent and prominent case. In Dolan,
the City of Tigard, Oregon, attempted to condition the approval of a
building permit upon the landowner’s compliance with open space,
landscaping, and alternative transit requirements. The question before the
Court was whether this attempted “exaction” by the City “constituted an
uncompensated taking of ... property under the Fifth Amendment.”47 At

45
See Laura S. Underkuffler-Freund, Takings and the Nature of Property, IX
CANADIAN J. L. & JURIS. 161, 165-66 (1996).
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512 U.S. 374 (1994).
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Id. at 13.
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various points, the Court alternately implied that the “property” interest at
stake was the right to exclude (which was sometimes portrayed as absolute
in nature and sometimes not), the right to use, the entire parcel owned, or
the narrow strip of land subject to the challenged regulation.48 Problems of
this sort have led a host of commentators to characterize the Court’s
portrayals of property in takings cases as unexplained, unexplored, and
essentially incoherent.49
In Lucas, Justice Scalia was apparently determined to avoid the
intellectual murkiness and sleights of hand that so often have plagued the
Court’s takings jurisprudence. Indeed, Lucas is replete with references to
an intention to confront previous prevarications and to shine the spotlight
of incisive intellect into the dark corners of applied takings doctrine.
Incoherent areas that seemed to have been noticed by everyone but the
Court were suddenly, startlingly, and refreshingly acknowledged. For
instance, in the course of his opinion, Justice Scalia:
• acknowledged that the “conceptual severance” or
“denominator” problem in takings cases had not been
confronted by the Court. In determining the magnitude of the
property owner’s loss, one must know the “property interest”
against which the loss of value is to be measured. However,
if (for instance) 90 percent of a tract of land must be left in its
natural state, “it is unclear whether we would analyze the
situation as one in which the owner has [lost all value] ..., or
as one in which the owner has suffered a mere diminution in
value of the tract as a whole.”50
• acknowledged that the distinction between “harmpreventing” and “benefit-conferring” regulations (with the
former traditionally held to be a part of a property owner’s
48

See id. at 384-87.
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“expectations” and the latter not) “is often in the eye of the
beholder” and is “difficult, if not impossible, to discern on an
objective, value-free basis.”51
• acknowledged that the problem in determining what “law”
frames property rights is a difficult one. For instance,
“background principles of nuisance and property law” may be
“manipulable,” and “[t]here is no doubt some leeway in a
court’s interpretation of what existing state law permits.”52
After frankly acknowledging these problems, Justice Scalia did not
attempt to resolve them. Rather, he pushed them aside as he drove toward
his conclusion. On the “conceptual severance” or “denominator” problem,
he announced that “we avoid this difficulty in the present case, since the
‘interest in land’ that Lucas has pleaded (a fee simple interest) is an estate
with a rich tradition of protection at common law.”53 His response to the
“harm-preventing”/ “benefit-conferring” problem was simply to jettison
this as a valid consideration.54 On the question of what “law” frames
property rights, he vaguely cited state “nuisance law,” state “property law,”
and “existing rules and understandings that stem from an independent
source such as state law”55 – potentially conflicting understandings.
In the end, the question of adequate doctrinal reckoning with these
problems was dwarfed in importance by the acknowledgment of their
presence. Once it is admitted that the Emperor has no clothes, it is far more
difficult to take him seriously. The admission of these problems by the
architect of the Scalian enterprise did not immediately doom it. Indeed, as
described above, Lucas marks its clear ascendency. However, even as
Lucas struck a bold stroke for the Scalian view, however, it also
undermined it. Belief in a rigidly protective view of takings law depends
on belief in the fiction of property’s concreteness. Once Justice Scalia
acknowledged the mythic nature of this image, the door was opened to
more and more explicit challenges.

51
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B. “Property, Property Everywhere”: the Eastern Enterprises and Phillips
Cases
Perhaps even more fatal to the old, concrete, unexamined idea of
property were the Court’s two, arguably most protective takings cases:
Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel56 and Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation
(“IOLTA I”).57
These cases highlight a truth about takings cases that we must
remember. Takings may involve more than land, chattels, and other
traditional forms of property. Over the years, the right to vindicate one’s
“reasonable expectations,”58 the right to “anticipated [commercial]
gains,”59 the rights enumerated in an executed contract,60 and the right to
“economic advantages” “back[ed] by law”61 have been protected by the
Court. Indeed, any individual interest created by law might be something
on which the individual sufficiently relies, or to which the individual has
sufficient claim, to be constitutionally cognizable property. It was the
question of the limits, if any, to property’s scope that Eastern Enterprises
and Phillips explored.
Eastern Enterprises confronted a challenge to the Coal Industry
Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992 (“Coal Act”),62 which stabilized funding
for pension plans benefitting the nation’s retired miners. Under the Act,
coal operators were assessed premiums to be paid to the plans, based upon
their prior employment of miners now retired. Eastern Enterprises was
assigned the obligation to pay premiums for some 1,000 miners who had
worked for the company before 1966, some twenty-five years prior to the
Coal Act’s adoption. Eastern sued, claiming that the Act effected a taking
of its property without compensation.
In a series of prior decisions that spanned some thirty years, the
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Court had upheld similar social welfare legislation against employers’
takings challenges.63 The Black Lung Benefits Act of 197264 and the
Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 198065 required
employers to pay disability or pension compensation to former employees
or their survivors, despite the companies’ refusal to voluntarily undertake
that obligation. With respect to those statutes, the Court agreed that the
legislatively imposed liability “constituted a permanent deprivation of
assets” for social welfare purposes, but rejected the notion that it
constituted an uncompensated taking prohibited by the Fifth Amendment.66
Analysis in those cases began with recognition of the unquestionably broad
power of Congress to fashion economic legislation.67 “In the course of
regulating commercial and other human affairs, Congress routinely creates
burdens for some that directly benefit others.”68 As a result, “legislation is
not unlawful solely because it upsets otherwise settled expectations.”69
In Eastern Enterprises, however, the Court’s plurality opinion took
a sharply different tack. In the plurality’s view, the Coal Act suffered from
several constitutionally fatal defects. First, the financial burden that the Act
imposed was not proportionate to the company’s prior, voluntary
undertaking. The industry’s commitment to the funding of lifetime health
benefits for retirees and their family members occurred after Eastern had
ceased its coal mining operations. The plurality observed:
During the years in which Eastern employed miners,
retirement and health benefits were far less extensive ...,
were unvested, and were fully subject to alteration or
termination. ... Although Eastern at one time employed
Combined Fund beneficiaries that it has been assigned ...,
the correlation between Eastern and its liability to the
Combined Fund is tenuous ... . The company’s obligations
63
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under the Act depend solely on its roster of employees
some 30 to 50 years before ..., without any regard to
responsibilities that Eastern accepted under any benefit
plan the company itself adopted.70
Indeed, the plurality wrote, the Coal Act substantially interfered
with Eastern’s “property” – its “reasonable investment-backed
expectations.”71 By imposing liability for employees employed many years
ago, the Act attached “new legal consequences” to a completed
employment relationship.72 “‘Retroactive legislation ... presents problems
of unfairness that are more serious than those posed by prospective
legislation, because it can deprive citizens of legitimate expectations and
upset settled transactions.’”73 The retroactive operation of the Coal Act was
apparent, since it “divest[ed] Eastern of property long after the company
believed its liabilities [to these employees were] ... settled.”74 Eastern had
no notice from “the pattern of the Federal Government’s involvement in the
coal industry ... that lifetime health benefits might be guaranteed to retirees
several decades later.”75 As a consequence, the Act effected a taking of
property without compensation.
Of course, the Black Lung Benefits Act – which the Court had
previously upheld – also charged employers with the health care costs of
employees, whom those employers had employed decades before. Liability
for the disabilities of black lung disease was no more contemplated or
accepted by those coal operators, than was the pension liability
contemplated or accepted by Eastern. The plurality distinguished the Black
Lung Benefits Act, however, on the ground that it “merely imposed
‘liability for the effects of disabilities bred in the past,’” and was “‘justified
as a rational measure to spread the costs of the employees’ disabilities to
those who have profited from the fruits of their labor.’”76 “Likewise,
Eastern might be responsible for employment-related health problems of all
former employees whether or not the cost was foreseen at the time of
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employment ... .”77 “There is no doubt that many coal miners sacrificed
their health on behalf of this country’s industrial development,” and that
Congress could afford them relief as a matter of policy.78 The problem was
that the solution that the Coal Act embodied imposed “such a
disproportionate and severely retroactive burden upon Eastern.”79
The idea that proportionate impact and retroactivity might be
relevant to a due process challenge to legislation is not shocking. Even
notice and consent might conceivably be relevant as defenses to a charge
that particular legislation violates particular individuals’ due process rights.
By framing this as a takings issue, however, the plurality opinion extends
citizens’ rights to a potentially unimaginable degree. The “property
interest” that the Court protected in this case was not Eastern’s ability to
retain its money; monetary liabilities to government for the ends of social
welfare are ubiquitous, through taxation and other schemes. Rather, the
“property interest” that Eastern was held to have is something far more: it
is the right to be free of social welfare legislation that upsets expectations,
affects one disproportionately, or is imposed without consent.
The potential reach of this holding is awe-inspiring. What piece of
legislation does not upset expectations, affect some person
disproportionately, or cause financial loss without consent? Whether one
considers tax legislation, agricultural regulations, import-export duties,
consumer product safety legislation, banking regulations, welfare programs,
school funding programs, or a myriad of other government acts, it is
obvious that the hundreds or thousands of these enacted every year upset
expectations, impose liability on the basis of past relationships and actions,
and disproportionately benefit some to the detriment of others. And never
has the constitutionality of such laws hinged upon notice or consent. Do all
citizens affected by such laws now have “property interests,” protected by
“takings” law? What, indeed, is the reach of the Eastern Enterprises
rationale?
The Justices of the Court were not unaware of the problem that the
plurality’s opinion created. Justice Kennedy, concurring in the judgment
and dissenting in part, strenuously argued that the Act “must be invalidated
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as contrary to essential due process principles,” and not as a violation of the
takings clause.80 “The plurality opinion,” he wrote, “would throw one of
the most difficult and litigated areas of the law into confusion, subjecting
States and municipalities to the potential of new and unforseen claims in
vast amounts.”81 “Property” for takings purposes must be understood more
specifically and traditionally, he argued, “lest all government action be
subjected to examination [as takings] ... , with the attendant potential for
money damages.”82 “The liability imposed on Eastern no doubt will reduce
its net worth and its total value, but this can be said of any law which has
an adverse economic effect.”83 Neither freedom from such impacts nor
freedom from the laws that create them can be “property” that the takings
clause protects. We cannot expand the scope of regulatory takings to
include broad inquiries into what are essentially “normative considerations
about the wisdom of government.”84
Similar concerns were expressed by Justice Breyer’s dissent, which
Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg joined. “The ‘private property’
upon which the [Takings] Clause traditionally has focused,” he wrote, “is
a specific interest in physical or intellectual property.” This case involves
only “an ordinary liability to pay money, not to the Government, but to
third parties.”85 “If the Clause applies when the government simply orders
A to pay B, why does it not apply ... [to any] tax?”86 And why would it not
apply “to some or to all statutes and rules that ‘routinely creat[e] burdens
for some that ... benefit others?’”87
If Eastern Enterprises signaled a rush toward the finding of
“property everywhere,” Phillips (“IOLTA I”) confirmed it. Phillips
involved a challenge to Texas’ Interest on Lawyers Trust Account (IOLTA)
program, which was virtually identical to programs enacted in 48 other
States and the District of Columbia. Under this law, an attorney who
received client funds was required to place them in a separate, interestbearing, federally authorized (“IOLTA”) bank account, upon determining
80
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that the funds “‘could not reasonably be expected to earn interest for the
client or [that] the interest which might be earned ... is not likely to be
sufficient to offset the cost of establishing and maintaining’” a private,
interest-bearing, non-IOLTA account.88 The interest that the IOLTA
account generated was then paid to the Texas Equal Access to Justice
Foundation, which financed legal services for low-income persons.
This law was challenged by depositors of client funds, who claimed
that it violated their rights under the takings clause. In Phillips, the
question before the Court was a narrow one: whether “interest earned on
client trust funds held by lawyers in IOLTA accounts [is] a property interest
of the client or lawyer, cognizable under the ... Fifth Amendment.”89
The law of Texas, like most states, follows the general rule that
“interest follows the principal.” Thus, as a general matter, interest earned
by a client’s trust account funds is the property of the client. The twist in
Phillips was that the client funds placed in IOLTA accounts were placed
there because they would – on their own – generate no net interest. Held
in a non-IOLTA account, these funds were too small in amount, and held
for too brief a period, for any interest earned to offset the cost of
establishing and maintaining the account, service charges, accounting costs,
and tax reporting costs that the account would generate. In other words, the
placing of these funds in IOLTA accounts deprived the claimants of zero
dollars of economic value.
This did not deter the Court. In a 5 to 4 decision, the Court held
that the claimants nonetheless demonstrated a property interest cognizable
under the takings clause. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist
asserted that “[w]e have never held that a physical item is not ‘property’
simply because it lacks a positive economic or market value.”90 Indeed,
“we [have] held that a property right was taken even when infringement of
that right arguably increased the market value of the property at issue.”91
Of course, Phillips involved no “physical item” in any traditional sense; at
issue was interest that would not be earned, absent the challenged statutory
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scheme. This, however, made no difference. Although not deprived of
property in that sense, the claimants were deprived of “possession, control,
and disposition” – and the “confiscation” of these rights is an interference
with “property” cognizable under the takings clause.92
If Eastern Enterprises and Phillips are taken together, the potential
scope of “takings” expands enormously. Any law that upsets expectations,
imposes liability on the basis of prior relationships and actions, or
disproportionately benefits some to the detriment of others, is now fair
game. In addition, it is not even necessary that the claimant show
economic injury – far more intangible interests, such as “control” over
government actions, are protected as well. Rights under “existing
legislation”? Immunities for specific groups, that regulations create?
Disproportionate impacts of local laws, or complaints about the use of tax
money? There is no apparent intellectual barrier to “property” interests in
any of these cases, and to resultant takings claims.
As the scope of “property” expands, what the Court finds to be a
“taking” of that property must contract. No complex society can adhere to
a rule that makes it liable for every change in circumstance,
disappointment, or frustration that every individual endures at government
hands. Indeed, what the Court granted in “IOLTA I,” it took away five
years later. In Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington (“IOLTA II”),93
the Court faced the question not reached in Phillips: whether the
constitutionally cognizable “property” that the Court had found to be at
stake in Phillips was “taken” by the Washington State IOLTA scheme, in
a way that the Fifth Amendment recognized.94 The Court held that it was
not. What was the reason? The IOLTA scheme “had no adverse economic
impact on petitioners and did not interfere with any investment-backed
expectation.”95 Since “the value of the petitioners’ net loss was zero, the
compensation that is due” was also zero.96 In short, without economic
harm, there will not be (in the vast run of cases) a Fifth Amendment
“taking” or a “right to compensation”.97
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*****
Under the Scalian view of property and takings, property is the
(effectively) limiting concept, with a taking routinely found if property is
impaired. With the specter of “property” interests created by virtually any
statute, court decision, regulation, and expectation, this approach became
untenable. No longer could the simple Scalian rule realistically provide its
simple guarantee. While the expansionist ideas of property in Eastern
Enterprises and Phillips may have cheered protectionist proponents, those
same ideas worked – inevitably – toward the undermining of their ideal.
C. The Problem of Justice
The final and most fundamental reason for the ultimate defeat of the
Scalian view of property and takings is found in an old idea: the need to
account for justice in applying the takings clause.
The conviction that justice is deeply involved in takings cases has
long been articulated by the Court. In Armstrong v. United States,98
decided more than forty years ago, the Court famously stated that the
takings clause was “designed to bar Government from forcing some people
alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be
borne by the public as a whole.”99 Since Armstrong was written, this
language has appeared in virtually every opinion that the Court has issued
construing this clause.100
The repeated invocation of “justice” and “fairness” in takings
opinions, however, generally has been an awkward one. Although justice
is presented in these passages as the analytical lynchpin for these decisions,
when the Court’s actual reasoning is examined it seems to be largely an
afterthought.
Take, for instance, the Dolan101 case, which involved a takings
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challenge to “exactions” demanded by a city in exchange for the granting
of a municipal building permit. In the first paragraph of his analysis, Chief
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, repeated the Armstrong
language and declared that the achievement of justice and fairness must
guide the resolution of the case.102 Yet, in the ensuing and lengthy
discussion of the issues involved, neither justice nor fairness is mentioned
again. In holding that the City of Tigard had failed to establish a sufficient
factual basis for its permit conditions, the Court reasoned from various
legal premises that were identified in the opinion. In this process, neither
“justice” nor “fairness” nor its equivalent appears.
This pattern is repeated in case after case. Although the question of
“justice” or “fairness” is continually invoked as the central inquiry before
the Court, it is rarely addressed in any depth in the discussion that follows.
Indeed, when we think of the mass of the Court’s decisions in this field, it
is difficult to articulate how “justice” or “fairness” should be evaluated in
these cases. Exactions are demanded by a city as the price for approval of
a development proposal. Is this “just”? Is this “fair”? A developer’s plans
are thwarted by coastal wetlands regulations. Is this “just”? Is this “fair”?
When we consider the Court’s opinions in this field, in the aggregate, there
is little guidance on these issues. All sides claim the importance of justice,
because it “feels right” and taps into our deep instinct that this must be the
vital issue. Yet, after this acknowledgment, the question of “justice” or
“fairness” is left unexplored, unexplained.
The reason for this failure to grapple with the question of justice has
been undoubtedly different for different members of the Court. For those
who have adhered to the Scalian view of takings and property, the meaning
of “justice” in this context was apparently so obvious that it needed no
explanation. For those who have opposed the Scalian view, the
understanding of justice that it entails – although apparently often assumed
by these justices to be correct as well – sat uneasily with the ends they have
wished to reach. As a result, “justice” has been, for them, something to be
simply, quietly, and almost conspiratorially ignored. Rather than rethink
the question of justice, they have simply sidelined it.
What is this Scalian notion of justice, that has been assumed so
powerfully in this context? Let us again consider the Lucas case. In Lucas,
102
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the question was whether a state’s prohibition of development of shorefront
land, to preserve the beach/dune system and prevent erosion, was a taking
of property without compensation. In his analysis of this question, Justice
Scalia discussed how this law brought the landowner’s plans “to an abrupt
end,” and severely impacted him financially.103 He discussed how there
might be situations, such as those involving zoning or other controls, when
a complaining landowner gains from the challenged law – but that this was
not such a case. He concluded, in brief, that Lucas should be saddled with
such uncompensated loss only if the restriction should have been
“expected” by him or “part of his title to begin with.”104 If neither was true,
compensation would be owed.
What is most striking about this view of justice in takings is its
completely one-sided character. Although the interests of the property
owner are scrupulously considered, there is no consideration of the
interests of the state, or of those whom it represents.
Indeed, it is fair to conclude that under the Scalian view,
consideration of asserted public interests in the broad run of takings cases
is not simply ignored – it is, in fact, illegitimate. In his concurrence in
Palazzolo, for instance, Justice Scalia described the value that accrues to
the public through wetlands preservation laws as “profit to the thief.”105 A
thief is, of course, someone who has – by definition – no legitimate interest
to assert. In this view, we do not have parties with legitimate, dueling
interests; we have one party with legitimate interests, and the other party
with none.
This view of the interests at stake is remarkable when we remember
that the question of justice or fairness in law – on which takings cases are
purported to depend – is an inherently relational inquiry. When we decide
whether a law or its operation is “just,” this is an inquiry about the
advantages and disadvantages that “x” derives from the operation of that
law, or its absence – and the advantages and disadvantages that are suffered
by “y”. Indeed, when considering “justice” in law, we cannot evaluate the
claim of one party without reference to the other. Yet that is precisely what
the Scalian view of justice in takings demands. It demands that we imagine
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the interests of one party – the takings claimant – and not the interests of
the other.
The reason for the single focus of the Scalian view is its assumed,
prior beliefs about the nature of the individual’s claimed right and of the
competing public interest. The Scalian view sees the individual landowner
as a project pursuer, with a right to act, who is wronged by government
action. Because the government “transgresses the side constraints
constituted by [the individual’s] rights,” it becomes the individual’s moral
debtor.106 The government must pay for the owner’s loss. It is a question
of compensatory justice.
Public interests are eclipsed, in this view, because of its
foundational assumption that the claimant is the victim, and the government
the aggressor. With the moral stakes thus drawn, the “justice” question is
simple. It is how to rectify this wrong – not whether there is a wrong, in
light of the merits of (or need for) the opposing public action.
For those cases decided during the 1990s, when the Scalian view
reigned, this view of justice was plausible. In this era, the typical case
before the Court juxtaposed significant injury to property owners with
relatively trivial public interests. For instance, the local land-use concerns
in Nollan, Dolan, and City of Monterey (such as ocean viewing, drainage
concerns, vegetation concerns, and so on) were not of a kind that demanded
a public dimension to “justice.” Even Lucas, with its shoreline concerns,
had little public impact by virtue of the “rare” facts presented. Seldom will
a completely buildable lot be rendered “worthless,” as the result of
government regulation.107
If this view of the competing interests at stake was plausible in all
of these cases, it was not in Palazzolo and Tahoe. The simple story in
which the landowner is the “victim” and the public the “aggressor” is
unconvincing when individual actions destroy thousands of acres of
wetlands, or threaten a resource as valued as Lake Tahoe. In these cases,
the loss of individual landowners’ “rights” was viewed against the
backdrop of a tremendous public loss if the Court were to adhere to the
Scalian vision. Public interests could no longer be ignored – and the
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simple scheme of “compensatory” justice for “victims” of government
action became suddenly and patently inadequate.
In Palazzolo, the Court’s majority hinted at the need for a more
contextual and balanced approach to the ultimate takings question, which
would include the consideration of public interests.108 In Tahoe, this
change in focus was explicit. We are concerned, Justice Stevens wrote,
with a lake that is “uniquely beautiful, ... a national treasure that must be
protected.”109 Individual landowners’ development actions, however,
threatened the lake’s pristine state and exceptional clarity.110 “‘[U]nless the
process [of degradation] is stopped, the lake will lose its clarity and its
trademark blue color, becoming green and opaque for all eternity.’”111
Against the magnitude and gravity of this potential loss,
interference with the complaining landowners’ claimed right to build
rapidly paled in comparison. The “ultimate constitutional question,”
Justice Stevens wrote, “is whether the concepts of ‘fairness and justice’ that
underlie the Takings Clause” will be better served by a per se
compensatory rule, or by a “‘careful examination and weighing of all of the
relevant circumstances.’”112 Building moratoria such as that imposed in the
Tahoe case are used widely by land-use planners to preserve the status quo
while they formulate a more permanent development strategy.113 “The
interest in facilitating informed decisionmaking by [such] regulatory
agencies counsels against adopting a per se rule that would impose ...
severe costs on their deliberations.”114 Rather than assume that a
compensatory obligation by government exists, we should use a careful,
contextual, ad hoc approach in such cases.115
The shift toward an idea that justice requires consideration of
competing interests and competing claims is apparent throughout Justice
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Stevens’s opinion. Although interference with a property owner’s
investment-backed expectations must be considered, it “‘is [only] one of
a number of factors that a court must examine.’”116 Competing with the
interests of the complaining landowners in the Tahoe case are other public
and private interests that depend upon the lake’s preservation. All of these
interests must be considered if “justice and fairness” – the bottom-line
inquiries – are to be achieved in regulatory takings cases.117
The extent to which the majority veered from the Scalian path was
not lost on the dissenters. Chief Justice Rehnquist, whom Justices Scalia
and Thomas joined, argued that the case must be viewed “[f]rom the
[complaining owners’] ... standpoint.”118 Since value was taken from the
owners with no return, the case required compensation. Indeed, the
dissenters’ assumption that the landowners’ loss – and only the
landowners’ loss – should be considered in such cases is graphically
illustrated by the physical structure of the Chief Justice’s opinion. In a
paragraph at the very end of his opinion, set apart from the rest by three
asterisks, he acknowledged that “Lake Tahoe is a national treasure[,] and
I do not doubt that respondent’s efforts at preventing further degradation
of the lake were made in good faith in furtherance of the public interest.”119
However, these “efforts,” as the physical and symbolic separation of their
description attests, are simply an afterthought. They are a touching story,
perhaps – but of no palpable legal interest.
To ignore the bilateral nature of justice in property cases is, in truth,
the very deepest of ironies. Land-use disputes, of the kind that Tahoe,
Palazzolo, Lucas, and like cases present, involve competing property
interests.120 What these cases really involve is the pitting of the interests
of the complaining landowners to develop their land against the property
interests of other shoreline owners and users. It is difficult to see why the
property interests of some should be exalted, and the same interests of
others ignored, in a searching assessment of “justice.”
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Indeed, more than other claims that are constitutionally based,
property claims are so often – by their very nature – unavoidably reciprocal
in character. Freedom of speech, due process of law, freedom of religion,
and other basic rights are – in a sense – “public goods,” which can (in
theory, at least) be enjoyed equally and freely by all, without cost to or
deprivation of some by others. The character of property claims to physical,
finite, nonshareable resources is necessarily the opposite. The claim of the
takings claimant to unfettered control of land, chattels, or other resources
necessarily and inevitably denies the same claims to control asserted,
through government, by others. In this situation, we do not have a simple
“evil” done by government to the takings claimant: we have reciprocal
“evils,” done by reciprocal actors.
By simultaneously stressing the importance of justice in takings and
attempting to restrict its scope, the Scalian view is an inherently unstable
concoction. It forces us to imagine justice, in takings, as half of the whole
– the sound of one hand clapping.
IV. CONCLUSION
With the decision in Lucas in 1992 and for almost ten years
thereafter, the Scalian view of property and its protection dominated
Supreme Court takings jurisprudence. Under this vision, property provides
a concrete, objectively knowable, and immutable legal barrier which marks
the line between protected individual interests and the exercise of collective
power. If government transgresses this line, the individual is almost
always deemed to have been wronged. And compensation is required, as
a matter of “compensatory” justice, under the takings clause.
In the past few years, the hegemony enjoyed by this view has
crumbled. After Palazzolo and Tahoe, no longer will the idea of property
– itself – mark, with certainty, where protected individual interests end and
collective power begins. No longer will the fact of individual loss, even
significant individual loss, necessarily compel the conclusion that a wrong
has occurred, or drive an award of compensation home. We must, instead,
view individual losses in these cases in the social, economic, and political
contexts in which they occur. We must “weigh all of the relevant
circumstances.” We must make ad hoc, normative judgments. We must
consider how all affected persons should share the “benefits and burdens
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of economic life.”
The confidence with which I have declared the death of the Scalian
view of takings is rooted less in a conviction about the constancy of
Supreme Court jurisprudence, than in the contention that the ideas that
form the core of the Scalian view doomed it from the start as a viable
juridical principle. Its idea of property as a concrete, pre-political, selfdefining concept was inevitably exposed as mythical. Its expansion – as
“concretely” understood – to encompass virtually any reliance interest
created by law inevitably proved to be impractical. And, as public costs
loomed, its eclipse of public interests in the takings calculation could not,
in the end, be reconciled with the idea of justice for all parties.
The Scalian view of property and its function is, of course, not a
completely fanciful or improbable one. Indeed, it can be seen, at its core,
as a attempt to articulate a vision of property that all of us, on some level,
share. The idea of property rights as fixed, unyielding, bounded, and
protected responds to the deep insecurity that individuals feel in the face
of the constant threat posed by collective power. If we are honest, we must
admit that each of us believes in this idea for some objects, for some
claims, for some assurance that our own psychological needs will be
respected and our own acquisitive efforts rewarded. The Scalian view’s
bold attempt to guarantee the vindication of this idea has powerful appeal.
Its assertion that the “takings” guarantee is simply an extension of this
function seems, superficially at least, to be a natural one.
The problem arises when this vision of property is presented as the
sole and motivating idea for resolving takings issues. Had the scope of
American takings law remained what it was in the pre-Mahon121 era – had
it remained concerned with “physical,” as opposed to “regulatory” takings
– the seeming equivalence of the idea of property and the outer boundaries
of the permissible exercise of government power might have remained
unquestioned. If, for instance, we limited the scope of takings questions to
the takings of title by government, or to physical occupation of land by
government, the cases would be simple enough, and our notions of
protected interests in these cases would be strong enough, that the
conclusion that the idea of property “resolves” these takings issues would
(coincidentally) be true.
121

See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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But American takings law has not remained so limited. Instead, it
has expanded to include regulatory takings, “intangibles” takings, takings
of every conceivable form and fashion. This expansion has defeated the the
simple equivalence of pre-conceived notions of property and the
permissible scope of government power. In these cases, we have no
concrete, ready-made notions of property upon which to rely. Indeed, the
idea of property as a concrete, fixed, and bounded entity cannot, by
definition, be congruent with the idea of property as a potentially unlimited
field of individual reliance interests. As notions of “property” and
“takings” expand, we must concede that we cannot resolve these claims
without considering the competing claims of others.
In a way, one might say, the Scalian view wanted it all. It wanted
to maintain the image of property as clear, pre-ordained, fixed, and
bounded. It wanted to extend this image to ever more far-flung and
intangible legal interests. And when, as a result of this enterprise, conflicts
with other (public) interests mounted, it claimed exemption from a
balancing of interests. Although appealing in simple contexts, the Scalian
view is, in the end, practically, legally, and philosophically impossible.
The idea of property rights as fixed, unyielding, bounded, and
protected is an emotionally important one for each of us. However, the
gulf between this vision of property rights and their necessary institutional
contingency is profound. Property’s function, as a social and political
institution, is the resolution of conflicting needs, visions, values, and
histories. If we refuse to question the premise that the idea of property is,
itself, determinative of these conflicts – if we refuse to acknowledge the
complex, interrelated, and allocative nature of property conflicts – we will
fail to account for the true costs of our actions, individually and
collectively. We will fail to intelligently confront our choices. And we
will fail to vindicate the ideal of justice, which takings jurisprudence has
so stubbornly retained.
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